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Abstract
This paper examines the quotation behaviour of dealers who made markets in
the same stocks on both NASDAQ and either EASDAQ or the LSE. Whereas
previous studies examine international integration at the market level, we examine
integration at the dealer level. In other words, do dealers within the same market-
making firm use information from their arm on the opposite side of the Atlantic in
forming their own quotes? We find that while there is some evidence of integration
at the market level, integration is hard to detect at the dealer level. The results are
largely unaffected by differences in fungibility between our two samples.
1. Introduction
Over the past decades, there has been a clear movement towards globalisation of both
corporations and securities markets. Investors in one country are increasingly able to
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easily purchase securities in other countries. In addition to securities markets becoming
more global, market-making firms have also become global. There are now a number of
market-making companies with operations in multiple markets around the world. The
question we study is whether such firms operate in an integrated manner. This paper is
a first look at international intra-dealer integration.
Previous studies of cross-listed shares trading on home and foreign markets generally
conclude that markets are less than fully integrated.1 Several reasons have been advanced
as to why. In broad terms, these reasons fall into two categories; fungibility and home
bias. Fungibility reasons focus on the barriers to buying cross-listed shares in one
market and reselling on the other market. For example, in many instances, there are extra
transactions costs or conversion fees incurred when trading across markets. In the USA,
foreign shares are often cross-listed as American Depository Receipts (ADRs). An ADR
is a financial instrument issued by a US bank representing foreign shares held in trust
by the bank, and there is a conversion fee required to assemble or disassemble the ADR.
Another transaction cost example is the stamp duty reserve tax on UK shares.2 This tax
would apply to a trader trying to buy and sell shares cross-listed in the UK. Still another
fungibility issue is that the majority of cross-listed shares trade in different currencies
in the home and foreign markets.
Conversely, the home-bias explanation of why markets are not fully integrated
focuses on inherent differences between the two markets. There can be cultural and
language differences between traders in home and foreignmarkets. These differences can
potentially affect the release, dissemination and interpretation of information. However,
as Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) and Menkveld (2008) point out, traders can differ in
their ability to cross markets. For example, informed traders such as institutions may
have the ability to easily access liquidity in foreign markets.
Similar to Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) and Menkveld (2008), we hypothesise that
not all dealers have the same fungibility and information constraints. Dealers with
multinational arms may be able to partially bypass fungibility barriers because they
ostensibly maintain a supply of shares in both the markets where the cross-listed share is
traded.3 Further, such firms might plausibly share information about stocks. If the home
dealer has superior information about a cross-listed stock, that informationmay be shared
with the foreign arm of the same market-making firm. We call this type of information
sharing intra-dealer integration, which in turn can promote market integration.
To examine the degree of intra-dealer integration, we analyse two samples containing
cross-listed stocks on NASDAQ and EASDAQ, and NASDAQ and the LSE respectively.
These two samples differ in their level of fungibility, allowing us to disentangle this
impact.All companies in both samples have at least onemarket-making desk that operates
on both sides of the Atlantic. We analyse these market-maker quotes to see whether there
1 See for example Eun and Sabherwal (2003), Grammig et al. (2005), Hupperets and
Menkveld (2002), Karolyi (2006), Moulton and Wei (2009) and Phylaktis and Korczak
(2004).
2 http://www.direct.gov.uk/MoneyTaxAndBenefits/Taxes/TaxOnSavingsAndInvestments/
TaxOnSavingsAndInvestmentsArticles/fs/en?CONTENT_ID=10013514&chk=Tac6CP
3 Porter et al. (2008) examine another interesting aspect of dealers with multinational arms.
They show that dealers with operations in multiple countries can avoid disruptions to trading
by shifting trading to a non-affected location in the event of such interruptions as a power
failure.
is any evidence of integration betweenmultinational arms of these market-making firms.
Surprisingly, we do not find much evidence that a dealer is influenced by the presence of
colleagues in the same firm but on the other side of the Atlantic. We start by establishing
market-level integration for our sample stocks and documenting the relative contributions
of NASDAQ vs. EASDAQ/LSE to price discovery both over the full day and during the
trading overlap. We then check whether dealers whose affiliates make markets in the
stock on the other side of the Atlantic (henceforth ‘global’ or ‘affiliated’ dealers) are
able to post more competitive quotes, i.e. whether their bid-ask spreads are lower and
whether they spend more time alone on the inside of the market’s bid-ask spread than
do unaffiliated dealers. The answer turns out to be no. Further, affiliated dealers do not
appear to post more informative quotes when the respective markets open. Finally, we
check more directly for evidence of global dealers’ coordination by studying whether,
during the trading overlap, their European and American arms are more likely to be
on the same side of the efficient price than a control pair of unrelated dealers. Again,
the answer turns out to be no. Further, dealers fail to be influenced by the presence of
foreign affiliates even when the affiliate is in the dominant market (in terms of price
discovery) for the stock in question. In short, global securities firms do not makemarkets
globally.
In the next section we discuss the literature related to this study. Section 3 describes
the structure of the markets we examine, while Section 4 describes our sample selection
criteria and data. Section 5 reports the results of our analysis and Section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Although there is no literature on multinational market maker integration, there are
studies that examine integration of domesticmarketmaking firms. For example,Naik and
Yadav (2003) investigate whether market-making firms on the London Stock Exchange
adopt a firm-wide portfolio approach in managing inventories. They conclude that
these firms instead allow individual market makers to manage their inventories on a
stock-by-stock basis. In contrast to Naik and Yadav, Coughenour and Saad (2004) find
that on the NYSE, specialist firms do appear to employ a firm portfolio approach in
managing individual stock inventories. Anand (2005) examines market quality measures
for specialists employed by the same firm making markets on competing exchanges. He
finds significant differences in the way in which the specialists compete for business,
but that execution does not seem to vary significantly within a firm. The above studies
then differ in their conclusions concerning market-making firm integration, with those
examining US firms suggesting a higher level of intra-dealer integration than do the
studies of UK firms. However, none of the studies examines the type of intra-firm
integration studied in this paper – the co-movement of quotes within dealer firms but
across markets for identical assets.
Although little investigation of intra-dealer quote integration has been produced to
date, a relatively large body of research examines inter-market integration (sometimes
referred to as fragmentation), where stocks are traded in more than one market. In the
USA, Battalio et al. (1997) show that despite the substantial diversion of order flow
to regional stock exchanges from the NYSE, market quality is relatively unaffected.
Hasbrouck (1995) shows that for the thirty Dow stocks, nearly all price discovery takes
place on the NYSE, with the regional exchanges contributing very little. Fong et al.
(2000) study the determinants of off-market trading in Australian stocks, and find that
off-market volume is strongly related to various measures of liquidity on the primary
market.
Internationally, Werner and Kleidon (1996) examine the intra-day volatility, spread
and volume patterns for some British companies’ shares on the London Stock Exchange
and their ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange and conclude that these markets are
not integrated. Hupperets and Menkveld (2002) report similar findings for Amsterdam/
NYSE cross-listings. Further, they find that a given market’s share of price discovery
during the overlap period (using the Hasbrouck (1995) methodology) varies widely
across the stocks in their sample. Their overall conclusion is that the two markets are
not perfectly integrated. Domowitz et al. (1998) study dual listed Mexican stocks at
home and in the USA, and find that the fragmentation of order flow has an adverse
effect on liquidity, but that the cross-border competition reduces spreads. Pulatkonak
and Sofianos (1999) study the determinants of the market share of NYSE in the trading
of multiple-listed non-US stocks. They find that the relative volume traded in the USA
is strongly inversely related to the time zone difference between the home market and
New York.
The theoretical literature contains a number of predictions regarding the effects of
market fragmentation on security trading. Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) consider a
model where the informed trader and some, but not all, liquidity traders have discretion
to choose in whichmarket to trade. At the equilibrium, there is a concentration of trading.
Small liquidity traders with discretion over the location of their trade, concentrate their
trades in the market that has the largest amount of trading by other liquidity traders who
are unable to move to another market. In turn, this market will attract additional informed
traders and liquidity traders. However, this model does not consider competition between
the exchanges. Menkveld (2008) presents a model that specifically addresses instances
where securities are traded on markets with overlapping trading hours. In the presence
of sufficient (local) liquidity trading, informed traders who have access to both markets
will split their orders across the two markets, and trading will concentrate in the overlap.
Also related to this study, is the strand of literature devoted to price discovery for
cross-listed stocks. These studies tend to examine a focused group of cross-listed firms.
The results of these studies are mixed; with some showing that price discovery occurs
primarily in the home country, while others find a larger share of price discovery in the
foreign market. Among those finding home country price discovery dominance are Kato
et al. (1990) who examine 23 stocks cross-listed in NewYork (eight fromAustralia, eight
from Japan, and seven from the UK) The authors conclude that home country prices lead
NewYork prices. Grammig et al. (2004) examine three German stocks cross-listed on the
New York Stock Exchange and find results consistent with Kato et al. In contrast, Lau
and Diltz (1994) find, for a sample of seven cross-listed Japanese stocks, that the foreign
market (NYSE) dominates the home market in price discovery. Finally, Lieberman et al.
(1999) obtain mixed results. They find that for five of the six cross-listed Israeli stocks
in their sample, the Israeli market dominates the US market, while for one stock the
reverse is true. Therefore, the directionality of price discovery for cross-listed stocks
appears to vary depending on the stock traded, the exchanges, or both.
Based on the studies cited above, the general conclusion is that markets are less
than fully integrated. There is also mixed evidence concerning domestic dealer firm
integration with regard to inventory management. In this paper, we examine another
dimension of intra-dealer integration – quotation behaviour. Do dealer firms allow
market-making arms in different countries to establish quotes independently – similar
to what Naik and Yadav (2003) find for individual dealer inventories? Or is there some
evidence of integration through information sharing – similar to what Coughenour and
Saad (2004) find for specialists’ inventories? Intra-dealer quote integration would result
in separate arms of the same dual-market dealer firm setting their quotes for identical
assets in a like manner. Further, integrated dealers will quote more aggressively than
unaffiliated dealers if integrated dealers can receive private information from their
cross-Atlantic siblings. In the following sections we analyse our data for evidence of
intra-dealer integration.
3. Markets and Integration
3.1 Institutional background
In this section, we briefly describe the EASDAQmarket and compare themicrostructures
of EASDAQ and the London Stock Exchange to that of NASDAQ. For more institutional
information, see Smith et al. (1998) and Barclay et al. (1999) for NASDAQ, Tirez (1999)
for EASDAQ, and Werner and Kleidon (1996) for the London Stock Exchange.
In 1994 the European Association of Securities Dealers (EASD), created a European
counterpart to NASDAQ, called EASDAQ. After securing the necessary approvals,
the EASDAQ market opened for trading in November 1996. NASDAQ helped to create
EASDAQ, and it also took a small stake in the EASDAQmarket. InApril 2000,NASDAQ
acquired amajority stake in EASDAQ, renaming it NASDAQEurope. In 2003NASDAQ
closed NASDAQ Europe.
3.2 Structural description
Not surprisingly, EASDAQ, the LSE, and NASDAQ are structurally similar. All are
quote driven markets, although NASDAQ includes public limit orders and alternative
trading system quotes (such as those from Island or Instinet) in the calculation of the
best bid and offer. EASDAQ and the LSE are pure dealer markets during the time of our
study.4
The market structures of all three markets are closer than in many previous studies
of market integration.5 All three are decentralised markets where trades occur over the
phone or via e-mail (except for trades on NASDAQ ATSs that occur automatically).
For trades done over the telephone, dealers on both markets know the identity of the
broker placing the order – in the case of institutional trades this often means knowing
the identity of the trader. In addition, all markets have similar post trade transparency.
On NASDAQ transactions have to be reported to the market within 90 seconds and on
both EASDAQ and the LSE within 180 seconds. On NASDAQ and EASDAQ the trade
price and volume are disseminated as soon as the report is received. Block trades on the
4 The LSE began SETS in October 1997 for the 100 most active LSE stocks. SETS is a
central limit order book that allows public limit order traders to compete with dealers on a
time priority basis. Since then the LSE has included more stocks and established another
system called SETSmm which is a combination of SETS and a dealer market. However,
during 1999 all of our sample stocks were traded in a pure dealer market on the LSE.
5 For example, Werner and Kleidon (1996) compare the London Stock Exchange (a pure
dealer market during their sample period) and the NYSE (a hybrid order driven market).
LSE are subject to delayed reporting to give market makers a chance to unwind their
positions.
During the period of our study, on NASDAQ the minimum tick size is $1/32 or $1/16
while our sample of EASDAQ and the LSE stocks have a minimum tick of $0.01 and
GBP0.01, respectively. EASDAQ-listed firms were allowed to decide on the currency in
which its shares were quoted. In 1999, the only currencies used were US dollars, British
pounds and Euros.
4. Sample Selection and Data
We identify firms that trade on NASDAQ and either EASDAQ or the London Stock
Exchange during all of 1999. There are 15 such firms listed on EASDAQ/NASDAQ
during 1999. As mentioned above, firms listing on EASDAQ can choose what currency
their stocks are traded in. Previous studies of price discovery have found that exchange
rates explain a portion of innovation in price.6 Since a part of our study examines
the relative contribution of each market to price formation, we eliminate exchange
risk by only choosing those stocks that trade on EASDAQ in US dollars. Three
firms are then excluded that trade in Euros. As Werner and Kleidon (1996) point
out, lack of full fungibility may impede full integration between markets by limiting
arbitrage opportunities.7 The primary characteristic of fully fungible securities is that the
certificate traded in both markets is identical.8 Therefore we further limit our EASDAQ
sample to those cases where the common stock of a firm is traded on both EASDAQ
and NASDAQ. Five firms traded as depository receipts on EASDAQ and/or NASDAQ
and one as trades as a share of beneficial interest. These firms are excluded from our
sample. Our final selection criterion is that the security only be listed on EASDAQ
and NASDAQ. This requirement allows us to limit the influence of exogenous factors.
Eliminating the one firm that had three stock listings leaves us with five stocks in our
EASDAQ/NASDAQ sample. All of the stocks in our EASDAQ/NASDAQ sample have
at least one dealer firm making markets in the stock in both markets.9
6 See Kim et al. (2000), Grammig et al. (2005), and Phylaktis and Korzak (2004), among
others.
7 See Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999) and Gagnon and Karolyi (2006) for a discussion of
what constitutes full fungibility.
8 According to Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999), another characteristic is that no legal
restriction on cross-border trading and ownership exist. US citizens are not allowed to
directly invest in foreign securities. However, as Werner and Kleidon (1996) point out,
these restrictions are irrelevant for institutions who regularly trade in multiple markets
simultaneously. Therefore, there are no real legal restrictions on cross-border ownership for
institutions. One cost that does exist for institutions is the cost of clearing. EASDAQsecurities
were cleared and settled through the Cedelbank division of Euroclear while NASDAQ traded
securities are cleared through a number of institutions and settled through the Depository
Trust Corporation. Although the need to clear through multiple institutions increases the cost
of arbitrage, previous studies of market integration have also considered these costs.
9 Even if we do not exclude ADRs and stocks listed on EASDAQ and NASDAQ in different
currencies but simply form the EASDAQ/NASDAQ sample on the basis of data availability
(excluding stocks listed for only a fraction of the year and those averaging less than one dealer
quote per day during the overlap), the final sample will consist of the same five fully-fungible
same-currency pairs of securities.
Stocks traded on the LSE are all traded in pound sterling. Therefore, we cannot impose
the same currency requirement that we impose on EASDAQ stocks. However, we do
impose the restriction that sample LSE stocks are not traded on any markets other than
the LSE and NASDAQ. Seven stocks meet this requirement during the period of our
study, but two did not have a dealer firm operating in both markets, so they are excluded.
Lastly, the five sample firms are British and are traded on NASDAQ in the form of
ADRs. Thus the main difference between our EASDAQ/NASDAQ and LSE/NASDAQ
samples is fungibility.10
Our selection criteria result in five stocks that trade on both NASDAQ and EASDAQ
and five that trade on NASDAQ and the LSE. These sample sizes are similar to a number
of previous studies that examine international market integration (See Kato et al. (1990),
Grammig et al. (2004), Lau and Diltz (1994), Lieberman et al. (1999), and Karolyi and
Stultz (1996), among others.) EU data is obtained from EASDAQ and from the LSE
quote and trade disks for 1999. NASDAQ data are obtained from the 1999 NASTRAQ
CDs. All three data sets are similar and contain time stamped trade data which indicate
the price and quantity of each trade. Quote data includes all market maker quotes so
that we are able to identify individual dealers in each stock. This is in contrast to some
previous studies that could only examine the best bid and ask for a market (e.g., Werner
and Kleidon, 1996).
Descriptive statistics for our two samples are contained in Table 1. Our set of dual-
listed firms contains 3 US firms and 7 European firms. We improve the generality of our
tests by examining our firms for an entire calendar year. Overall, our sample contains
over 675,000 trades and over 685,000 quotes for the sample period.
Table 1 contains information regarding the number of dealers that make markets in
our sample stocks during 1999. The number ranges from 6 dealers for NTL trading on
EASDAQ to 42 dealers on NASDAQ for Danka Business Systems. The last 2 columns
of Table 1 report the number of dealers that make markets in both the US and EU. There
is at least one dealer making markets on both continents and the number reaches a high
of 8 for Shire Pharmaceuticals.
As in previous studies such as Grammig et al. (2004) our analysis focuses on the period
when both members of a market pair are actively trading. During the period of our study,
the EASDAQmarket is open from 09:30 to 16:30 Central European Time corresponding
to 03:30 to 10:30 EST (except for the period from the last Sunday of March through the
first Sunday of April, when this corresponds to the period from 02:30 to 09:30 EST).
Quotes and trade prints were disseminated in real time through EASDAQ’s own system
as well as through information vendors such as Bloomberg, Bridge, DataStream and
Reuters; however, all trading was done by telephone.
The London Stock Exchange is open from 8:00 to 16:30 Western European Time
corresponding to 03:00 to 11:30 EST (except for the period from the last Sunday of
March through the first Sunday of April, when this corresponds to the period from 02:00
to 10:30 EST). NASDAQ is open from 9:30 to 16:00 EST. Therefore, for most of the
year there is a one-hour overlap in trading hours on EASDAQ/NASDAQ and 2 hours
on LSE/NASDAQ. Focusing on quotes in these overlap periods allows us to examine
inter-market and intra-dealer integration most directly. We present a description of our
methodology and the results of this analysis in the next section.
10 Recall that the stamp-duty tax is a major impediment to fungibility for LSE-NASDAQ
cross-listed stocks.
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5. Methodology and Results
5.1 Market integration
Before examining intra-dealer integration across multiple markets, we analyse the
integration of the markets themselves, and seek to gauge the dominant market for each
of our stocks. As a first step in this direction, we test for cointegration between European
and US market prices for each of our sample stocks. To do so, we sample midquotes
during the trading overlap at 30-second intervals and conduct Augmented Dickey-Fuller
tests on the levels and first differences of the series of quotes. The null hypothesis of
a unit root can be rejected only for the first differenced series and not for the series
in level, which suggests that the series are integrated of order 1, hence we can test for
the existence of a cointegration relationship between the European and American price
quotes for all the stocks. Using the Johansen Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue statistics,
the hypothesis that there is a cointegration relationship between European and US prices
cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level for any of the ten stocks we study.11
We next calculate Weighted Price Contributions (henceforth WPC, see Barclay and
Hendershott (2003)) for each stock. These show what proportion of the total change in
stock price is accounted for by different time periods. We split the 24-hour day into the
following periods: US market close to European market open (i.e. the overnight period),
European open to US open (i.e. the portion of the day when only the European market
is open), US open to European close (i.e. the trading overlap), and European close to
US close (i.e. the portion of the trading day when only the US market is open). As the
basis for WPC calculations, we use inside quote midpoints of the open market (or their
average when both markets are open). The results are presented in Table 2.
For the EASDAQ-NASDAQsample (PanelA),we find thatmuchmore price discovery
takes place during the US-only period than in the European-only period. Even for LHSP,
where the share of the European-only period is the highest (0.248), US-only trading
contributes nearly twice as much (0.451) to price discovery. The overlap period’s share
is consistently around 20 percent (0.197 – 0.242). Thus, on a per-hour basis, the overlap
period contributes themost to price discovery in each of the five stocks. The fact that price
formation accelerates when a maximum number of market participants are involved may
be the result of the greater fungibility of shares for the EASDAQ-NASDAQ sample.12
Looking at the LSE-NASDAQ sample (Panel B), we find that once again, on a per-
hour basis, the overlap period contributes the most to price discovery in each of the
sample stocks. With the exception of MRNT and SIGYY, most of the remaining price
discovery (as with our EASDAQ/NASDAQ sample) takes place when only NASDAQ is
open. Although allocation of price discovery by time period is suggestive of the roles
different markets play, a more direct way to examine which market is dominant for a
given stock is to examine quote co-movement during the overlap period by using the
Hasbrouck (1995) methodology. Table 3 shows the Hasbrouck (1995) information share
range for each market in each of the stocks.
11 Results not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request.
12 Greater fungibility should facilitate order splitting across markets. Menkveld (2008) shows
that the overlap period should attract increased activity from traders who split orders across
markets, and that transaction prices become more revealing during the overlap owing to
competition between informed traders of both markets.
Table 2
Weighted price contributions.
This table reports Weighted Price Contributions for each stock. The calculations follow Barclay and
Hendershott (2003), and are based on inside midquotes of the open market, or the average of the
midquotes when both markets are open.
US close - EU open - US open - EU close -
Market Ticker EU open US open EU close US close
A. Stocks dual-listed on NASDAQ and EASDAQ
Easdaq FFTI 0.046 0.122 0.229 0.602
Easdaq IVIS 0.178 0.181 0.213 0.421
Easdaq LHSP 0.056 0.248 0.226 0.451
Easdaq NTLI 0.077 0.105 0.197 0.614
Easdaq PIXT −0.032 0.144 0.242 0.628
B. Stocks dual-listed on NASDAQ and the LSE
LSE DANKY 0.047 0.143 0.366 0.448
LSE MRNT 0.145 0.341 0.234 0.276
LSE SHPGY 0.042 0.201 0.361 0.393
LSE SIGYY 0.362 0.451 0.143 0.046
LSE SKYE 0.252 0.251 0.220 0.282
Table 3
Information shares of European and US dealers.
This table reports, for each stock, Hasbrouck (1995) information shares for European and US markets,
i.e. their proportional contributions to innovations in the common efficient price. The minimum and
maximum information share bounds for each stock are obtained following Baillie et al. (2002). They
are based on midpoints of best quotes for each market and are estimated for all trading days (after
eliminating days with no more than three updates on each side of the market), with overnight periods
excluded from the estimation. Quotes were sampled at 30-second intervals.
EU information
share
US information
share
Markets Nasdaq Ticker min max min max
A. Stocks dual-listed on NASDAQ and EASDAQ
Easdaq/Nasdaq FFTI 0.308 0.345 0.655 0.692
Easdaq/Nasdaq IVIS 0.496 0.547 0.453 0.504
Easdaq/Nasdaq LHSP 0.273 0.341 0.659 0.727
Easdaq/Nasdaq NTLI 0.150 0.174 0.826 0.850
Easdaq/Nasdaq PIXT 0.584 0.600 0.400 0.416
B. Stocks dual-listed on NASDAQ and the LSE
LSE/Nasdaq DANKY 0.143 0.166 0.834 0.857
LSE/Nasdaq MRNT 0.346 0.358 0.642 0.654
LSE/Nasdaq SHPGY 0.150 0.166 0.834 0.850
LSE/Nasdaq SIGYY 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
LSE/Nasdaq SKYE 0.752 0.755 0.245 0.248
Starting with LSE-NASDAQ stocks, the stock that stands out is again SIGYY, where
NASDAQ has a 0.000 information share during the overlap. This is consistent with both
the particularly small contribution of the NASDAQ-only time period to price formation
in this stock (Table 2) and with this stock having by far the lowest ratio of the number
of US trades to the number of European trades (Table 1). Similarly, for SKYE, the only
other LSE-NASDAQ stock where the LSE has an overwhelming share of trading, the
European market has the greater information share (0.75). For the other three stocks,
DANKY, MRNT, and SHPGY, NASDAQ is the dominant market in the overlap period.
For the EASDAQ/NASDAQ sample, information share results similarly make sense
given the distribution of trading across the two markets. Across the five stocks,
NASDAQ’s information share is by far the highest, at around 84%, for NTLI, for
which the ratio of the number of US trades to European ones is also by far the highest.
NASDAQ’s information share is also above a half for FFTI and LHSP, while price
discovery in IVIS and PIXT during the trading overlap is mainly EASDAQ-driven.
Overall, examining market integration for our two samples shows that neither sample
is overwhelmingly dominated by a single exchange (as is typically the case when one
studies stocks dual-listed on US regional exchanges). The fact that we have stocks where
most information during the trading day overlap appears to originate from Europe (IVIS,
PIXT, SIGYY, and SKYE) as well as those where most information comes from the
USA (FFTI, LHSP, NTLI, DANKY, MRNT, SHPGY) suggests that having an affiliated
dealer on either side of the Atlantic has the potential to be beneficial. Specifically, a
dealer might benefit from receiving information from its affiliate on the other, dominant
side of the market. Does this potential benefit of intra-dealer integration translate into
actual quotation behavior? We now examine this issue.
5.2 Intra-dealer integration
Recall that Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) and Menkveld (2008) argue that not all traders
have the same information and ability to trade in foreignmarkets. Ceteris paribus, dealers
with foreign affiliates have the ability to trade in multiple markets simultaneously and
the potential to share information cross-border. The degree of information sharing by
affiliated dealers remains an empirical question, which this study seeks to answer. In
order to examine the effect of dealer’s affiliation on their behavior, we need to construct a
control sample of unaffiliated dealers. Accordingly, we match affiliated dealers to their
controls based on quotation frequencies (the procedure is explained and the matches
are listed in the Appendix). We start by examining the effect of dealer affiliation on
quoted spreads. To do so, we calculate the best bid and the best ask for the group of
affiliated dealers in each stock, and separately for the control set of unaffiliated dealers.
Percentage spreads are based on these best bids and asks.
The results are in Table 4, which, for each market, shows spreads for the market
opening (OPEN), the period before the trading overlap in the case of European markets
(BEFR), the trading overlap (OVRL), the period after the trading overlap in the case of
NASDAQ (AFTR), and the market closing (CLOS). For each of these four periods, and
for each stock, four numbers are reported: the average percentage spread for affiliated
dealers, the average percentage spread for unaffiliated control dealers, the difference
between the two spreads, and the (two-tailed) p-value for the difference.
If affiliated dealers are integrated, there are two reasons to expect them to generate
lower spreads than do otherwise similar unaffiliated dealers. First, the pooling of
information sources across the Atlantic could be expected to reduce adverse selection
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costs. Second, being able to offset inventories could be expected to reduce inventory
costs. There is little evidence, however, that dealer affiliation consistently contributes
to narrower spreads. On the EASDAQ side, all EASDAQ-NASDAQ stocks have wider
spreads generated by affiliated dealers than by unaffiliated ones, and this pattern is
observed for each time period. On the NASDAQ side, IVIS, LHSP, and PIXT have wider
spreads generated by affiliated than by unaffiliated dealers at the market open, although
this pattern persists across all time periods only for PIXT.
For LSE-NASDAQ stocks, only SIG has significantly lower affiliated than unaffiliated
dealers’ spreads on the LSE (with the exception of the opening period). On the NASDAQ
side, however, the affiliated group produces lower spreads than the unaffiliated group in
all stocks exceptMRNT. Although these four stocks include the two (SIGYY and SKYE)
in which, according to Table 3, the dominant market is in Europe, supporting the idea
that having an affiliate in a better-informed market can enable a dealer to quote lower
spreads, this is undermined by the inclusion of DANKY, where EASDAQ contributes
little to price formation. In all, it is difficult to regard Table 4 as offering strong support
for the notion of intra-dealer integration in our dual-listed stocks.
Another way to detect if affiliation enhances dealers’ ability to compete for order
flow would be to examine whether affiliated dealers spend more time being alone on
the inside of the posted spread (either on the bid or on the ask side) than do unaffiliated
dealers. This issue is addressed in Table 5, whose structure mirrors that of Table 4.
On the EASDAQ side, only LHSP has affiliated dealers quote significantly more
aggressively than unaffiliated ones, and even that is only during the period before the
US market opens. On the NASDAQ side (for the EASDAQ-NASDAQ sample), IVIS’s
affiliated dealers spend more time alone on the inside than its unaffiliated dealer (as
long as EASDAQ is also open), as do LHSP’s affiliated dealers (but only at the time of
NASDAQ’s closing).
Quotations on the LSE likewise fail to link having an affiliated dealer with quoting
more aggressively. Of the five stocks, only SIG has affiliated dealers spending longer on
the inside (except at the time of the market’s opening). On the NASDAQ side, though,
four of the five stocks have affiliated dealers being more aggressive than unaffiliated
ones. However, the one exception is SIGYY (the NASDAQ counterpart of SIG), the
stock where all of the price discovery during the trading overlap takes place in Europe –
i.e. precisely the stock where one would expect that having a European affiliate would
be especially helpful to a US-based dealer. This pattern undermines the argument that
affiliation drives quoting aggressiveness.
Even if affiliated dealers do not quote more aggressively (or indeed, as is the case for
a number of stocks, less aggressively) than unaffiliated ones, it may nonetheless be the
case that ‘affiliated’ quotes are more informative. This issue is particularly interesting
to examine at a crucial time in price formation, i.e. at the market open. We measure
the informativeness of ‘affiliated’ (respectively, ‘unaffiliated’) opening quotes as the
distance from the average of the best bid and ask constructed for the set of affiliated
(respectively, control) dealers in the given stock to the first transaction price of the day.
This distance is expressed as proportion of the midquote, and reported in Table 6. That
table also reports quote informativeness for the market as a whole, and the difference
between affiliated and control dealers’ informativeness.
Although it is conceivable that having a US affiliate can help a Europe-based dealer
set better quotes at the time the European market opens, any effect is likely to be small,
as the USmarket will have been closed for many hours. Indeed, across our ten dual-listed
stocks, affiliated dealers appear to set more informative quotes than unaffiliated ones
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Table 6
Informativeness of opening quotes.
This table compares the informativeness of opening quotes for groups of dealers. For each stock, we
construct the best bid and ask separately for affiliated dealers and for the control set of non-affiliated
dealers (these are listed in the appendix). We then calculate the midquote (average of best bid and
ask) for affiliated (“Global”) and unaffiliated control dealers (“Control”), as well as for the market as
a whole (“All”). Informativeness for each group of dealers is then measured as the absolute value of
the difference between the midquote for that group and the first transaction price of the day, scaled by
the midquote. The column labeled “# days” reports the number of days used in the estimation. The
next three columns show the average informativeness for Global, Control, and All groups. The last two
columns show the difference between average informativeness of Global and Control groups, followed
by the p-value for the difference based on the paired t-test.
Market Ticker # days Global Control All Global-Control
A. Stocks dual-listed on NASDAQ and EASDAQ
Easdaq FFTI 68 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.004 0.00
Easdaq IVIS 142 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.001 0.12
Easdaq LHSP 210 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.10
Easdaq NTLI 63 0.017 0.019 0.018 −0.002 0.00
Easdaq PIXT 114 0.028 0.027 0.023 0.001 0.77
Nasdaq FFTI 237 0.017 0.013 0.006 0.004 0.00
Nasdaq IVIS 229 0.010 0.011 0.008 −0.001 0.19
Nasdaq LHSP 237 0.005 0.006 0.002 −0.001 0.03
Nasdaq NTLI 236 0.012 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.00
Nasdaq PLXT 219 0.041 0.059 0.014 −0.018 0.00
B. Stocks dual-listed on NASDAQ and the LSE
LSE DNK 241 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.44
LSE MRN 227 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.000 0.67
LSE SHP 241 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.67
LSE SIG 241 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.02
LSE SKP 241 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.003 0.00
Nasdaq DANKY 241 0.010 0.012 0.007 −0.001 0.04
Nasdaq MRNT 241 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.00
Nasdaq SHPGY 241 0.007 0.008 0.006 −0.001 0.11
Nasdaq SIGYY 205 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.000 0.46
Nasdaq SKYE 238 0.015 0.018 0.013 −0.003 0.01
only in the case of NTLI. On NASDAQ, however, one would expect the effect of having
a European affiliate to be stronger, since at the time of the US open, European dealers
are active and have been processing information about dual-listed stocks for almost the
entire trading day. The table shows that there are four dual-listed stocks where having a
European affiliate allows the US dealer to set more informative opening quotes: LHSP
and PIXT (which are also quoted on EASDAQ) as well as DANKY and SKYE (which
are also quoted on the LSE). However, this result is rendered more ambiguous by the
fact that these four stocks are not all characterised by high contributions of the European
market to price discovery, whether during the trading overlap (Table 3), or, as is more
pertinent here, as measured by the weighted price contribution of the time period when
only the US market is open (Table 2). Once again, therefore, it is difficult to regard the
evidence on opening quote efficiency as providing support for affiliated dealers being
integrated.
Our final attempt to tease out evidence of intra-dealer integration from affiliated
dealers’ price quotes investigates whether, during the trading overlap, a dealer is more
likely to quote prices in concert with its overseas affiliate than with an unrelated control
dealer. This investigation is conducted at the level of a dealer-stock combination and
proceeds as follows. First, we estimate a time series of efficient prices for each stock
during the trading day overlap.13 These prices can be interpreted as the best estimate
of underlying value of the stock at each point in time, given the price quote dynamics
on the two markets. The more two affiliated dealers are integrated, i.e. the more they
act as single dealer, the more frequently we would expect their quotes to be on the
same side of the efficient price. This is because they would have access to the same
information about the stock, and because they would care about their common (netted
out) inventory position. Thus, for each pair of affiliated market makers in each stock,
we calculate the proportion of time that the affiliated market makers were on the same
side of the efficient price, and compare it with the proportion of time than a control pair
of unaffiliated market makers is on the same side of the efficient price.14
The results are presented in Table 7. Remarkably, of the 19 instances of global market
making firms being active in the same stock on NASDAQ and in Europe, there is not a
single case where affiliated dealers behave significantly more alike than does a control
pair of unaffiliated dealers (indeed, there are two cases where the reverse is true). In the
case of LSE-NASDAQ stocks, one could attribute this in part to the fact that onNASDAQ
they are traded in the form of ADRs, which may complicate the netting out of inventory
positions. In the case of EASDAQ-NASDAQ stocks, however, there is perfect fungibility
across the two markets. Failure to detect coordination among affiliated dealers adds to
our accumulated evidence against intra-dealer integration in cross-listed stocks.15
Presumably, belonging to separate profit centres, as European and US desks of
securities firms do, is enough to discourage within-firm transatlantic cooperation.16 In
13 Efficient prices for each stock and at each point in time are estimated (as in Hasbrouck
(2007, p. 98)) as the forecast price to which quote midpoints on both markets converge (given
that these prices are cointegrated). We use 30-second intervals and 10 lags in the estimation
of the Vector Error Correction Models (VECM). We also estimated efficient prices with
alternative VECM specifications using the Akaike Information Criterion to determine the
optimal number of lags, which leads to similar results.
14 We only use cases where both members of a pair of affiliated dealers in a given stock have
matching unaffiliated dealers averaging at least one quote per trading day overlap.
15 As a further test for intra-dealer integration, we study the patterns of affiliated dealers’
contributions to price discovery, following theHuang (2002) application of theWPCmeasure.
Specifically, we check whether quote revisions due to affiliated dealers contribute more
to price discovery than those due to matching unaffiliated dealers (results available upon
request). In particular, we would expect a global dealer to be a particularly strong driver of
price discovery if its affiliate is located in the dominant market for the stock in question.
However, we do not find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis. On the ask side, global
dealers with affiliates in the dominant market have higher WPCs than unaffiliated matching
dealers for six of the ten sample stocks. On the bid side, this is the case for only five stocks.
16 Conversations with several of the European dealers included in this study suggested that
they generally maintained regular telephone contact with their US colleagues, but there was
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light of previous evidence that informed traders split orders across markets (Menkveld,
2008) and earn increased profits (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991) our findings suggest
that affiliated dealers may increase profits by creating global rather than regional profit
centres.
6. Conclusions
Our paper is the first to study what happens when the same firms are involved in market
making for the same securities on trading venues in different countries. One part of our
sample consists of stocks dually listed onNASDAQ and EASDAQmarkets. These stocks
have the advantage of near-perfect fungibility (as trades and quotes are in US dollars on
both venues, and the same assets – rather than ADRs – are involved on both venues),
but they have little liquidity and only several dual-market participants. Therefore, as
the second part of our sample we use stocks dually listed on NASDAQ and the LSE,
where liquidity is higher and dual-market dealers more numerous. The three markets are
similar, during the period of our study, in that they are essentially quote-driven, enabling
us to study quotation behaviour in the remarkable setting where securities, trading hours,
and market makers overlap between two market centres.
Our main finding is easy to summarise. While the markets themselves are integrated,
firm-level integration is hard to detect. There is little evidence that a dealer pays particular
attention to the quotes of her colleagues in the same firm but on the other side of the
Atlantic. This result offers a new insight into international stockmarket linkages at a time
when a cross-Atlantic exchange appears inevitable. More broadly, it is also indicative
of the difficulties multinationals face in truly integrating their activities. Global markets
have become more integrated over time. It will be interesting to see whether global
securities firms will become more integrated as well. This question is left to future
research.
Appendix: Matching unaffiliated dealers
This Appendix shows how a set of matching unaffiliated dealers was selected for
dealers who have affiliates across the Atlantic. To obtain a workable control sample
of unaffiliated dealers, we proceeded as follows. If most dealers were unaffiliated
(resp. affiliated), we matched affiliated (resp. unaffiliated) dealers to unaffiliated (resp.
affiliated) ones based on the total number of valid quotes, starting from the affiliated
(resp. unaffiliated) dealer with the smallest number of quotes, and without replacement.
Then, in instances where the set of matching dealers for a given stock could be reordered
so as to minimize the sum of differences between the quotation frequencies of affiliated
dealers and their matches, we did so. Lastly, we dropped cases where the affiliated dealer
has more than double the number of quotes of the matching dealer, or vice versa. The
resulting set of matching dealers is listed below. When the control dealer is shown in
parentheses, this indicates that the corresponding affiliated dealer averages less than one
quote per trading day overlap in the given stock, and is therefore only used for those
analyses where affiliated dealers are pooled rather than studied individually.
no formal system of sharing stock-specific information, possibly due to the fact that dual
listings represented a relatively small proportion of a dealer’s stocks.
A. Stocks dual-listed on NASDAQ and EASDAQ
Stock Affiliated dealer Control – Europe Control – US
4Front Technologies Herzog Puilatco First Albany
ICOS Vision Systems Herzog Puilatco Knight
SG Quartz Spear, Leeds & Kellogg
Robertson Stevens (KBC) Fleet
Lernout & Hauspie Speech Herzog Banque Populaire Mayer & Schweitzer
Products SG Quartz Sherwood
Robertson Stevens Paribas J.W. Genesis
NTL Herzog Quartz Salomon
PixTech Herzog BNP Spear, Leeds & Kellogg
B. Stocks dual-listed on NASDAQ and the LSE
Stock Affiliated dealer Control – Europe Control – US
Danka Business Systems Herzog HSBC Sherwood
Merrill SG Allen C. Ewing
Salomon Winterflood Robert W. Baird
Warburg – (Olde)
Merant CSFB – Jefferies
DLJ – National Financial
DKB – Montgomery
Goldman – Sherwood
Herzog Winterflood Salomon
Merrill – Spear, Leeds & Kellogg
Warburg – H.C. Wainwright
Shire Pharmaceuticals Bear Stearns – Natexis
CSFB – Sherwood
DLJ – –
DMG – –
Goldman Warburg Hambrecht & Quist
Herzog Winterflood Spear, Leeds & Kellogg
Lehman WestLB –
Merrill DKB Knight
Signet DMG SG (Sherwood)
Goldman Winterflood Knight
Herzog Cazenove (Mayer & Schweitzer)
Merrill Aitken Campbell (Spear, Leeds & Kellogg)
Warburg ABN AMRO (Natexis Bleichroeder)
Skyepharma Herzog Merrill Spear, Leeds & Kellogg
Salomon Warburg Volpe Brown Whelan
SG Winterflood Knight
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